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 For many British people, particularly those who are older, white and working-class, Enoch 
Powell remains remembered solely, and affectionately, for his controversial 1968 ‘rivers of 
blood’ speech, in which he prophesied racial conflict in Britain, due both to the scale of 
immigration during the late 1950s and into the 1960s, and the fact that these immigrants would 
then have children of their own, thus further increasing the non-white population of Britain. He 
thus called for an end to immigration, and, indeed, a policy of repatriation. This speech alone 
ensured Powell’s legacy, and even today, mention of his name will often evoke fond memories 
among some elderly voters; some of them might even suggest that Powell was ‘the best Prime 
Minister Britain never had’. Certainly, when there have been sporadic urban riots, or clashes 
between black youth and the police, even in the 21st Century, a few voices will always be heard 
asserting: “I’m not racist, but Enoch was right, wasn’t he?”  
 
Yet Powell is a very important political figure in post-1945 British history for reasons far 
beyond his trenchant views on immigration, important though these certainly were. Paul 
Corthorn’s Enoch Powell is therefore to be welcomed for several reasons. First, it is not a 
biography of Powell per se, but an authoritative and well-informed account of his beliefs and 
philosophy – their origins, their substance and their development. Second, this lucidly written 
book makes extensive use of Powell’s own previously unpublished archives, private papers 
and correspondence, and thus provides a truly original addition to the existing literature on 
Powell’s life and works. Third, rather than adopt a purely chronological approach, the book is 
organised thematically, with each chapter examining Powell’s stance and thinking on a specific 
policy. Fourth, Powell’s ideas and beliefs are contextualised, so that we understand what or 
who Powell was reacting to, or engaging with, in terms of policy developments and political 
events. Fifth, Corthorn highlights the manner in which Powell often found himself arguing with 
(or against) individuals and organisations who were, in many respects, his intellectual and 
ideological allies and kindred spirits. This aspect of Powell indicated his iconoclasm, for he 
sometimes found himself challenging, through didactic speeches and rigorous logic, erstwhile 
colleagues on the Right, such as the Conservative Party, and free-market think tanks like the 
Institute of Economic Affairs; his targets and criticisms were certainly not confined to the Left. 
 
Beyond his opposition to immigration, Powell was most renowned, at least among academics, 
for his economic stance. He was widely viewed as a maverick or lone voice for his economic 
views during the 1950s and 1960s, when he eloquently extolled the alleged virtues of the free 
market (what would now be called ‘neo-liberalism’) in an era when many very senior 
Conservatives had accepted aspects of dirigisme via Keynesianism, economic planning, and 
incomes policies. Powell denounced this, insisting that the immutable laws of supply and 
demand, and ‘the market’ could not be circumvented or eradicated by such idealistic naivety 
or intellectual fads. He shared, with Friedrich Hayek, a deep concern that State intervention in 
economic affairs was cumulative and exponential (what Hayek had warned was ‘the road to 
serfdom’), not least because politicians became convinced that further political control and 
regulation were the cure for economic problems, rather than often causing or exacerbating them 
– the medicine was actually making the patient more ill. He lamented the ‘prejudices which 
have been allowed to harden against the market economy’ [54], although by the 1970s, his 
economic arguments and warnings were being more widely accepted among some 
Conservatives, and it could be argued that he prepared some of the intellectual ground for 
Thatcherism in the Party, and its transformation into a party of neo-liberalism. 
 
The irony is that by the time Powell’s economic ideas were finally becoming more widely 
respected and accepted among some senior Conservatives, he had left to join Northern Ireland’s 
Ulster Unionist Party. This was after having urged British electors to vote for the Labour Party 
in the February 1974 general election, because Labour (but not the Conservatives) was 
pledging a referendum on whether the UK should remain in the European Economic 
Community (even though it had only joined the previous year). As a staunch opponent of UK 
membership – he was an unashamed nationalist and passionate advocate of ‘parliamentary 
sovereignty – Powell was prepared to countenance a Labour government solely to ensure a 
referendum in which he could actively campaign for the UK to ‘Leave’ the EEC. As with his 
economic ideas, Powell was in a minority at the time, although widely recognised as a very 
articulate and eloquent speaker and campaigner, a ‘cult figure’ perhaps, and maybe ‘ahead of 
his time’, but today, his hostility towards the EU – like his free-market economic ideas – is 
widely shared in the Conservative Party; indeed has become its default position. 
 
Yet Corthorn reveals that for much of the 1960s, Powell was actually in favour of UK 
membership of the then EEC, primarily because of the expected boost it would provide to 
Britain’s ailing economy and British agriculture. Powell’s stance changed considerably at the 
end of the decade, though, to the extent that he subsequently became one of the most trenchant 
critics of the UK’s membership. There was no specific event which prompted Powell’s 
apparent u-turn, but he increasingly developed arguments which focused on the loss of 
sovereignty and nationhood which the UK would suffer by joining an increasingly bureaucratic 
supranational institution, and this objection soon superseded his erstwhile support for 
membership on economic grounds [111]. It also compounded Powell’s personal and 
intellectual struggle with maintaining loyalty to the Conservatives’ parliamentary leadership, 
because he found it increasingly difficult to reconcile his continued support for the former Party 
of patriotism and defence of British institutions (key tenets of Conservatism) with what had 
seemingly become the Party of Europe, with Prime Minister Heath openly and enthusiastically 
pro-European: the political became personal, and Powell’s parliamentary speeches sometimes 
became acerbic in their rhetorical attacks on Heath, not just for his Euro-enthusiasm, but his 
increasingly dirigiste economic policies during 1972-73.  
 
Meanwhile, in spite of endorsing the Labour Party in the 1974 general elections (there were 
two, one in February, and another in October), solely because he viewed the promised 
referendum as a means of campaigning for a vote to Leave the EEC, Powell also recognised a 
constitutional conundrum: he believed strongly in an indivisible and inviolate form of 
parliamentary sovereignty, in which an elected Parliament (or, rather, the elected House of 
Commons) comprised MPs who exercised their judgement in making decisions on behalf of 
the electorate – Edmund Burke’s insistence that MPs were representatives, not delegates. Yet 
a referendum, in practice, meant empowering the electorate to express its views on a specific 
question on a particular issue, with MPs then expected to act on the electorate’s verdict. Such 
a form of ‘direct democracy’ – regardless of whether it is desirable in principle – is 
constitutionally incompatible with the precepts of parliamentary sovereignty, and Powell was 
uncomfortably aware of this.  
 
Having opposed the Conservative Party’s apparent commitment to European integration, 
Powell then became voluntarily embroiled in the tortuous politics of Northern Ireland, where 
paramilitary violence was a ‘normal’ occurrence in some districts. He joined the Official 
Unionist Party, a Protestant party committed to maintaining Northern Ireland’s constitutional 
status as a full member of the United Kingdom, and thus vehemently opposing (re-)unification 
with the Republic of Ireland. Yet even here, Powell soon found himself in conflict with some 
of his new party colleagues, because whereas many Unionists wanted Northern Ireland to be 
granted considerable devolution and self-government within the UK, Powell was an 
‘integrationist’ who wanted Northern Ireland to be politically tied more closely to the rest of 
Britain (England, Scotland and Wales) – a genuinely United Kingdom. Having opposed the 
UK’s membership of the EEC on the grounds of parliamentary sovereignty and opposition to 
European integration, Powell subsequently urged greater integration of Northern Ireland into 
the UK political system, which would thus mean that the Province would be much more 
actively and closely subject to the sovereignty of Parliament. In Powell’s view, the type of 
devolution and self-government favoured by many of his Unionist colleagues weakened the 
Union (between Northern Ireland and Britain), created divided loyalties (who were the 
Unionists loyal to – a devolved government in Belfast or Westminster?) and undermined the 
sovereignty of the UK Parliament, because the latter was expected to surrender considerable 
day-to-day control to a semi-autonomous sub-national political institution elected by the people 
of Northern Ireland only. 
 
What becomes clear from this clearly-presented and very well-written book is the extent to 
which Powell thought carefully and deeply about key issues and policies, spanning economic 
affairs, Europe, immigration, international relations, Northern Ireland, and sovereignty. 
Sometimes, as over British membership of the European Economic Community, his critical 
thinking and genuflection led him to change his mind, and in so doing, led him to diverge from 
the stance of the Conservative Party at the time (indeed, even depart from the Party altogether). 
On other issues, it was his firm beliefs and strong convictions which caused tensions with those 
around or close to him in the first place, such as his commitment to Northern Ireland’s closer 
integration with the UK, which was not widely shared by his Official Unionist party colleagues. 
Ultimately, one does not have to agree with Powell(ism) to acknowledge that he was one of 
Britain’s most iconoclastic and fascinating political figures, and no stranger to controversy, 
both because of some of his views, and the manner in which he expressed them.  
 
Moreover, he was simultaneously an intellectual in the Conservative Party, and a populist 
politician, with his views on issues such as immigration, and Europe, positing a distinction and 
divergence between ‘the people’ and ‘the political elites’, with the latter betraying the former. 
This particular theme has strongly re-emerged in recent years, as was clearly evident in the 
campaign for the UK to Leave the European Union, in order to curb immigration and restore 
parliamentary sovereignty. If Powell was still alive today, he would almost certainly have felt 
wholly vindicated. On the other hand, he might have felt apprehensive that neo-liberalism, 
which he did so much to promote and proselytise, now seems to be on the defensive, as ‘market 
failure’ has become exposed to more critical scrutiny and greater public awareness, in the 
context of austerity, decimated public services, lack of affordable housing, graduate debt, 
poverty wages, and massive inequality; the ‘trickle down’ of wealth long ago dried up – 
assuming, of course, that it ever occurred to start with. 
